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THE FLOATING LIEN CONTROVERSY IN THE
COURTS: JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE
PREFERENCE PROBLEM
HENRY S, HEALY*
INTRODUCTION
During the past ten years the validity of the "floating lien"' in
bankruptcy proceedings has been one of the foremost issues in discus-
sions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 2 The question has
generated a large volume of material in law reviews and treatises,' and
has been discussed in this Review on several prior occasions.' Until
very recently, however, the problem has received no judicial scrutiny.
It is the purpose of this article to examine four recent cases in which
this controversial issue has been decided. 5 The volume and quality of
the literature provides an excellent opportunity to measure the impact
of the commentators on the judicial process.
* B.S., College of the Holy Cross, 1960; LL.B., Boston College Law School, 1963;
Member of the Massachusetts Bar.
1 U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 3.
2 All references are to the 1962 Official Text.
3 See, e.g., 3 W. Collier on Bankruptcy § 60.51A (14th ed. 1968); Coogan & Bok,
The Impact of Article 9 on the Corporate Indenture, in 1 Secured Transactions Under the
U.C.C. 1341, 1391-96 (1963) ; Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-
Acquired Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 194 (1959); 2 G. Gil-
more, Security Interests in Personal Property 1298-1346 (1965) ; Gordon, The Security
Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Prefer-
ence Problem, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 49 (1963); Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 232 (1965) ; King, Section 9-108 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Does It Insulate the Security Interest from Attack by a Trustee in
Bankruptcy? 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117 (1966) ; Hogan, Games Lawyers Play with the
Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to Accounts and Inventory Financing, 53 Cornell L.
Rev. 553 (1968) ; Krause, Kripke and Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act:
Three Views on Preferences and After-Acquired Property, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 278 (1967).
4 Carroll, The Floating Lien and The Preference Challenge: Some Guidance From
the English Floating Charge, 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 243 (1967); Comment, The
Code in the Bankruptcy Courts: Some Significant Conflicts of Policy, 8 B.C. Ind. &
Com. L. Rev. 101 (1966).
5 In re Grain Merchants of Ind., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ind. 1968); In re
White, 283 F. Supp. 208 (S.D. Ohio 1967) ; In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co.,
271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass.
1967).
The Portland Newspaper and Grain Merchants cases are currently being appealed.
In re Grain Merchants of Ind., Inc., sub nom. France v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 7th
Cir. No. 17120; In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., sub nom. Williams v. Rose
City Dev. Co., 9th Cir. No. 22507-A.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Problem
Sections 60(a) and (b) of the Bankruptcy Act& give a trustee in
bankruptcy the power to avoid a transfer of the debtor's property to a
creditor if: (1) the transfer was made for or on account of an antecedent
debt; (2) the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer; (3) the
creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent;
(4) the transfer would enable the creditor to obtain a greater share of
his claim than another creditor of the same class; and (5) the transfer
occurred within four months of the filing of the petition initiating the
debtor's bankruptcy. It is the application of this language to "floating"
liens created under the Uniform Commercial Code which gives rise to
the problems discussed in this article.
Article 9 of the Code permits a creditor to obtain a security interest
in collateral which the debtor may acquire in the future, as well as col-
lateral in which the debtor has present rights.` This floating lien is of
particular importance where the collateral is in a shifting form. A good
example of this type of collateral is the inventory of a retail business,
which in the ordinary course is regularly being sold to customers and
replaced by new shipments. Another is accounts receivable, which are
regularly being collected by the debtor and replaced by new accounts.
Once perfected, the floating lien insulates the interest of the secured
6 11 U.S.C. § 96(a),(b) (1964). The pertinent language of section 60 reads as follows:
(a) (I) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the prop-
erty of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an
antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within
four months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating a pro-
ceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such
creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of
the same class.
(2) For the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, a transfer
of property other than real property shall be deemed to have been made or
suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien
upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple
contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee. . . . [Ill any
transfer . . . is not so perfected against such liens by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title,
it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before the 'filing of the
petition.
(b) Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiv-
ing it or to be benefited thereby or his agent acting with reference thereto has,
at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
is insolvent.
7 "[A] security agreement may provide that collateral, whenever acquired, shall
secure all obligations covered by the security agreement." U.C.C. § 9-204(3) ; see also
U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 3.
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party in the debtor's future collateral against claims of ordinary judg-
ment creditors of the debtor.'
The controversy between the bankruptcy trustee and the creditor
protected by a floating lien centers around two questions, or perhaps
one question viewed from two different angles. First, for the purposes of
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, when is an interest in the debtor's
after-acquired collateral "transferred" to the holder of a floating lien?
Second, is such a "transfer" of after-acquired collateral a transfer for
an "antecedent debt" as to collateral acquired by the debtor within four
months of the filing of a bankruptcy petition? Answers to these ques-
tions are discovered through an examination of additional provisions
of the Code and the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 60(a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act fixes the date on which
a transfer of the debtor's property is deemed to occur:
[A] transfer of property other than real property shall be
deemed to have been made or suffered at the time when it
became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such
property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a
simple contract could become superior to the rights of the
transferee.° (Emphasis added.)
A holder of a perfected security interest under the Uniform Commercial
Code has priority over ordinary lien creditors.' To be perfected, how-
ever, the security interest must "attach" to the collateral. Under section
9-204(1) a security interest does not "attach" until (1) there is a
written agreement that it attach, (2) an advance or payment is made
pursuant to the agreement and (3) the debtor obtains rights in the
collateral described in the agreement. In the case of inventory and
accounts a security interest, once it attaches, becomes perfected when
a financing statement describing the parties and the collateral is filed
with the appropriate office. 11 If filing takes place before the security
interest attaches it becomes perfected at the time when it attaches?'
8 U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(6).
° 11 	 § 96(a) (2) (1964).
1 ° U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(6). Section 9-301(3) defines a "lien creditor" as "a creditor
who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or the like and
includes an assignee for benefit of creditors from the time of assignment, and a trustee
in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition or a receiver in equity from
the time of appointment."
11 U.C.C. § 9-302(1).
12 U.C.C. § 9-303(1). U.C.C. § 9-204 states in part:
(1) A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement (subsection
(3) of section 1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights
in the collateral. It attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sen-
tence have taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching.
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From the foregoing statutory pattern the shape of the problem
begins to become apparent. An example will further demonstrate the
point. Secured Party and Debtor are parties to a written security
agreement covering inventory. A financing statement is on file and cash
has been advanced to Debtor pursuant to the agreement. Debtor has
an existing inventory. At this time, and at all subsequent times, Secured
Party knows that Debtor is insolvent. Six months later a petition in
bankruptcy is filed to adjudicate Debtor as bankrupt. In the four-month
period prior to the filing of the petition Debtor has had a considerable
turnover of inventory, including receipt of a number of new shipments.
The problem is whether trustee or secured creditor is entitled to the
new inventory received during this four-month period.
In the hypothetical, at least at first glance, all the elements of a
voidable preference are present. The Debtor's granting of a security
interest in the new shipments of inventory was a "transfer" of its
property to a creditor who at all times knew Debtor to be insolvent.
Under Section 60(a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act, quoted above, the
date of the transfer is the date on which it became perfected under
state law. 13
 Under section 9-204(1), the security interest did not attach
to the new shipments (and apparently did not become perfected as to
such shipments) until the Debtor obtained rights in them. This transfer,
apparently occurring at the time when the Debtor obtained rights in
the collateral, took place within the four-month period, and was on
account of an antecedent debt—the cash advanced to Debtor pursuant
to the security agreement. If, in the hypothetical, the collateral were
accounts receivable, the transfer of future accounts would also seem
to be for an antecedent debt because of section 9-204(2) (d), which
states that a debtor has no rights "in an account until it comes into
existence." When these Code sections are compared with the elements
of a preference, it appears that the trustee has a formidable case.
Section 9-108 of the Code attempts to remedy this problem by a
(2) For the purposes of this section the debtor has no rights
(c) in a contract right until the contract has been made;
(d) in an account until it comes into existence.
Once a security interest in inventory or accounts receivable. has "attached" it be-
comes perfected if a financing statement describing the collateral has been filed. If no
statement is on file prior to the time that the security interest attaches, it becomes per-
fected upon filing. U.C.C. §§ 9-302, -303. Filing is not required to perfect an assignment of
accounts receivable which "does not alone or in conjunction with other assignments to
the same assignee transfer a significant part of the outstanding accounts . . . of the
assignor...." U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (e).
13 McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 370 (1945) ; Matthews v. James
Jalcott, Inc., 345 F.2d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 1965) ; see 3 W. Collier, supra note 3, IT 60.39[2],
at 957.
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determination that the transfer of an interest in after-acquired property
is for "new value" and not for an "antecedent debt":
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obliga-
tion, releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives
new value which is to be secured in whole or in part by after-
acquired property his security interest in the after-acquired
collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not
as security for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his
rights in such collateral either in the ordinary course of his
business or under a contract of purchase made pursuant to
the security agreement within a reasonable time after new
value is given.
It is established, however, that the only element of a preference
which is a matter of state law is the date on which the transfer be-
comes perfected. The definition of an "antecedent debt," being a
matter of federal law," raises a serious problem: is the definition
embodied in section 9-108 an impermissible conflict with federal law?"
To determine whether the approach of section 9-108 can be squared
with the intent of Congress, it is first necessary to examine the leg-
islative history of the preference concept. Consideration of the legis-
lative history is also helpful for understanding and evaluating the
theories which have been advanced to justify the validity of the
floating lien against the preference challenge.
B. The Development of the Preference Provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act
The preference language of the 1898 Act was essentially identical
with the present section 60(a) (1) and the first sentence of section
60(b). The 1898 Act dealt with transfers to a creditor made by an
insolvent debtor within four months prior to bankruptcy. If the trans-
fer was made on account of an antecedent debt, and the creditor was
aware of debtor's insolvency, the transfer was characterized as a
voidable preference." A number of cases decided under the 1898 Act
permitted creditors, who had entered into agreements with debtors
prior to the four-month period, to escape the preference pitfall even
14 Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635, 639 (D. Mass. 1967). "Under the Bank-
ruptcy Act the definition of what constitutes an antecedent debt is not one to be deter-
mined by state law." In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D.
Ore. 1967) ; see 3 W. Collier, supra note 3, 9 6039E21, at 960.
15 See Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 49, 57-61 (1962) ; Ken-
nedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems
Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 518, 546-49 (1960).
10 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 60 a, b, 30 Stat. 562.
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though they did not take all steps necessary to perfect their liens
until shortly before bankruptcy. Such cases were based on the idea
that the pre-existing security agreement gave the creditor an "equi-
table lien," which the courts considered sufficient to complete a trans-
fer at the date of the agreement rather than the date when final steps
for perfection were taken. The perfection shortly before bankruptcy
was held to relate back to the date of the original agreement." Sexton
v. Kessler's was the leading case reaching this result. There, the
debtor agreed to hold certain securities for the benefit of a creditor.
This agreement was made more than four months prior to the debtor's
bankruptcy. The securities were not delivered to the creditor, however,
until two weeks before bankruptcy. The Supreme Court of the United
States held that an equitable lien, valid against the preference chal-
lenge, was created by the agreement regardless of the failure to perfect
the security until shortly before bankruptcy.
Cases such as Sexton v. Kessler" led to considerable agitation
for an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act which would eliminate this
type of "equitable lien." In 1938 the Chandler Act provided such an
amendment by adding a clause to section 60(a) stating that for pur-
poses of that section a transfer shall be "deemed to have been made at
the time when it became so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser
from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any
rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the
transferee therein . . . ." 2° (Emphasis added.)
17 See Bailey v. Baker Ice Mach. Co., 239 U.S. 268 (1915); Carey v. Donahue,
240 U.S. 430 (1916); Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U.S. 90 (1912). See also H.R. Rep. No. 1293,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949). A general discussion of these cases appears in 3 W. Collier,
supra note 3, at fl 60.37.
18 225 U.S. 90 (1912). Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
[T]here can be no doubt ... that before the bankruptcy the ... [creditor] had
an equitable right at least to possession if it wanted it. While the phrase equitable
lien may not carry the reasoning further or do much more than express the
opinion of the court that the facts give a priority to the party said to have it,
we are of the opinion that the agreement created such a lien at least, or in
other words, that there is no rule of local or general law that takes from the
transaction the effect it was intended to produce. . . . When the . . [creditor]
took the securities it only exercised a right that had been created long before the
bankruptcy and in good faith.
Id. at 98-99.
19 Cases cited note 16 supra; see articles collected in 3 W. Collier, supra note 3,
60.37, at 940 nn.81-83. Professor McLaughlin stated that "[t]he equitable lien is a
dangerous and elusive enemy of the law of preference. As applied to some bankruptcy
cases it seems as well named as the Holy Roman Empire, for it is neither equitable nor a
lien." McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 341, 389 (1927).
29 Act of June 22, 1938 ch. 575, § 60a, 52 Stat. 869. The House Report states,
"[ t]he new test is more comprehensive and accords with the contemplated purpose of
striking down secret liens. . . . As thus drafted, it includes a failure to record and any
other ground which could be asserted by a bona fide purchaser or a creditor of the
transferor, as against the transferee." H.R. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1937);
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The legislative history of the Chandler Act gives strong support
to the conclusion that the language quoted was aimed at the elimina-
tion of "secret" liens of the sort involved in Sexton v. Kessler. The
draftsmen were, however, a little too thorough. Professor Gilmore
described the result as "the classical example of overkill." 21 The use
of a "bona-fide purchaser" test resulted in decisions such as Corn
Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder,' which rigorously adhered
to the literal wording of the clause just quoted. Klauder involved an
assignment of accounts receivable by Quaker City Company to a bank.
The arrangement was of the revolving credit type' and the bank did
not give notice to the persons who were obligated to Quaker City on
the accounts. Pennsylvania law provided that between two assignees
of the same account receivable, the first to notify the account debtor
of the assignment would prevail. The United States Supreme Court
ruled that the "bona-fide purchaser" language of section 60, as amended
in 1938, applied to postpone the "transfer" of accounts to the bank
until account debtors were notified. Since no such notification was given
to any account debtors under the financing arrangement being used by
the parties, Quaker City's trustee in bankruptcy became entitled to
all the company's outstanding accounts receivable. The effect of this
decision was to invalidate most non-notification accounts receivable
financing. It also raised serious questions about inventory financing,
where customers always acquire goods free of existing security interests.
In 1950 the "bona-fide purchaser" test was dropped, and the
present sections 60(a) (2) through (8) were adopted, establishing the
"lien creditor" test." Under the "lien creditor" test, as discussed pre-
See also Analysis of H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d. Sess. 188 (1936), quoted in 3 W. Collier,
supra note 3, ¶ 60.38, at 942-43.
21 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 1302:
[Tlhe unpremeditated destruction resulted from the facts that in all inventory
financing buyers take free of the security interest and that, in so-called English
rule states, the assignee of a chose in action who did not notify the obligor of
his assignment could lose to a later assignee. [Footnotes omitted.] Thus such
arrangements could never be perfected against potential "bona fide purchasers"
and consequently could always be avoided as preferences....
22 318 U.S. 434 (1943). Mr. Justice Jackson noted that the decision was undoubtedly
the result of a literal reading of the Act, and that such a construction could lead to harsh
results. Id. at 436-37. See also In re Varaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562, 563 (ED. Mo.
1943); 3 W. Collier, supra note 3, at 11 60.38.
23 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 260 (1965).
24 The House Report noted:
In Sexton v. Kessler ((1912) 225 U.S. 90), the Supreme Court, under the
language of the Bankruptcy Act prior to the 1938 amendment, recognized as
valid a pledge of stocks and bonds consummated within the 4-month period, at a
time when the pledgor was insolvent, because a promise to make a pledge had
been made before the commencement of the 4-month period. This result was
reached on the doctrine of "relation back."
Similarly, in Carey v. Donohue ((1916) 240 U.S. 430), the Supreme Court
recognized as valid an unrecorded deed to real estate, on the ground that the
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viously, a transfer is deemed to take place at the time it becomes so
far perfected under state law that no ordinary lien creditor of the
debtor could obtain rights superior to those of the transferee.
A consideration of the legislative history of the preference pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Act points to two conclusions. First, the
tests of section 60(a) (2 ) are aimed at "secret" liens, of the type in-
volved in Sexton v. Kessler. Second, Congress intended to protect
security interests, which are protected under state law against judg-
ment creditors of the debtor.
II. THEORIES ADVANCED TO SUPPORT THE POSITION OF
THE SECURED CREDITOR
A number of theories have been advanced to support the position
that security interests in after-acquired property can survive the pref-
erence challenge. The following is a summary of the various suggestions
made by writers in the field.
applicable State statute did not make such a deed invalid as against judgment
creditors. The Carey case accordingly became known as the "pocket lien" case.
In 1938 the Bankruptcy Act was amended to obviate the effect of these
cases which were regarded with disfavor by the great majority. But, in so doing,
the authors of the amendment went further than was necessary, and it brought
about results which they did not anticipate. The amendment placed the trustee
in the position of an artificial potential bona fide purchaser, and, by so doing,
unintentionally invalidated many types of liens acquired in good faith and for
value, in normal and accepted business and financial relationships.
The matter was first brought to a focus in 1943, in the case of Corn Ex-
change National Bank & Trust Company v. Klauder (318 U.S. 434, 63 Sup. Ct.
679, 87 L. Ed. 884), in which the Supreme Court, because of the new language,
felt constrained to strike down an assignment of accounts receivable taken by a
bank long prior to the beginning of the 4-month period and for value because it
had failed to comply with the requirement of notifying the account debtors,
which, under the applicable State law, was necessary in order to cut off the
rights of a possible second assignee. And this, despite the fact that no second
assignee was involved in the case at all.
The resultant confusion has cast grave doubt upon the validity of normal
business security....
H.R. Rep. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1949).
The committee pointed out that the objections of the bill were, inter alia:
(A) To retain unimpaired the basic object of the 1938 amendment, which
eliminated the "relation bath" doctrine of Sexton v. Kessler, and the "pocket
lien" doctrine of Carey v. Donohue referred to above;
(B) To eliminate the evil of allowing a trustee in bankruptcy to take the
position of a potential and artificial bona fide purchaser, and to restore him to
the position of a lien creditor, in harmony with his functions under the Bank-
ruptcy Act...
Id. at 6.
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A. The "Entity" Theory
The "entity" theory considers the present and future inventory
or accounts of the debtor as a mass, independent of the individual items
or accounts which combine to make up that mass. Proponents of this
view consider that the transfer of this "entity" or "mass" of collateral
takes place at the time the perfected security interest attaches to the
initial components of the mass." The time at which the security in-
terest attaches to later components is immaterial for purposes of
determining the existence of a voidable preference. This theory has its
roots in the statement by Chief Judge Magruder in Manchester Nat'l
Bank v. Roche:"
[I]n other words, the res which is the subject of the lien ...
is the merchandise or stock in trade, conceived of as a unit
presently and continuously in existence—a "floating mass"
the component elements of which may be constantly chang-
ing without affecting the identity of the res."
Support for the theory can also be found in the fact that the business-
man probably considers stock in trade or accounts receivable as a
continuing, independent entity, separate from its individual compo-
nents.'
The reply of the trustee to the entity theory is that (1) the
carefully drafted provisions of, and Official Comments to the Uniform
Commercial Code disclose no trace of this concept," and that (2) the
terms of section 9-108 demonstrate that a very different method of
resolving this problem was in the minds of the draftsmen of the Code."
B. The "Lien Creditor" Theory
The "lien creditor" theory is based on the proposition that once
a security agreement is executed, a financing statement is filed, and
25 See, e.g., Coogan & Bak, supra note 3, at 1396-98; Freidman, supra note 3, at
215-16; Henson, supra note 3, at 248-49. Professor Gilmore has suggested that earnings
of the debtor under future contracts may be presently existing "general intangibles."
2 G. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 1307; see U.S.C. §§ 9-105, -106.
26 186 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951).
27 I . at 831. •
28 As early as 1906 Professor Williston stated: "filo the mind of the layman a
stock in trade has a continuous existence as an entity irrespective of the articles which
compose it." Williston, Transfers of After-Acquired Personal Property, 19 Harv. L. Rev.
557, 581 (1906).
29 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 3, at 53-56; 3 W. Collier, supra note 3, ¶ 60.51A,
at 1050.14 -1050.15; King, supra note 3, at 1123-24.
30 See Friedman, supra note 3, at 219-220; King, supra note 3, at 1124. The lan-
guage of § 9-108, it is suggested, indicates that the draftsmen believed that security in-
terests in after-acquired property did not become fully perfected until the debtor obtained
rights in the individual items of such property. The Code seeks to avoid the preference
problem by stating that the transfer of an interest in these after-acquired items shall
not be deemed to be for an "antecedent debt."
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funds are advanced under the agreement, no levying creditor under
state law can obtain priority over the interest of the secured party
in the after-acquired property. Such an interest, it is argued, meets
the test of section 60(a) (2) which fixes the date of a "transfer" at the
point where it becomes so far perfected under state law that no ordinary
judgment creditor's lien on the property could become superior to that
of the transferee."
The trustee, in reply, maintains that the time of the perfection
of a transfer is a matter of state law, and that the Code provides
explicitly that a security interest is not perfected until the debtor
acquires rights in the collateral."
C. The Substitution of Collateral Theory
The "substitution of collateral" theory is based on a premise long
recognized under section 60. Often a creditor will permit a debtor to
substitute new collateral of equivalent value for that being held under
a security agreement. It is established that such a substitution, made
within four months of bankruptcy, does not constitute a voidable
preference, except to the extent that the new collateral is worth more
than the old. Of course, the theory will not be applied unless the
substitution of the new collateral precedes, or is simultaneous with, the
release of the old. 33 In the context of the hypothetical used previously,
the proponents of this theory would say that shipments of inventory
received or receivables arising during four months prior to bankruptcy
would be considered as "substituted" for those previously sold or col-
lected. The transfer "substituting" new for old collateral would not
be preferential, so long as the values are approximately equivalent.
The proponents seek to avoid the necessity of simultaneous release
and substitution by relying on Section 9-205 of the Code, which elim-
inates the requirement that the secured party must police his col-
lateral." They suggest that the requirement of simultaneous release
and substitution would be a re-imposition of this "policing" duty, and
would be inconsistent with section 9-205.
The trustee's position is that the requirement of simultaneous
release and transfer is a matter of settled bankruptcy law, and that
state law is immaterial." The trustee would limit use of the "substitu-
tion of collateral" theory to instances of actual one-for-one substitution,
as under a revolving credit arrangement.
31 See, e.g., King, supra note 3, at 1132-33.
32 Krause, Kripke and Seligson, supra note 3, at 289-90.
33 Walker v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 217 F.2d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 1954) ; In re
Pusey-Maynes-Breish Co., 37 F. Supp. 316, 321 (ED. Pa.), aff'd, 122 F.2d 606 (3d Cir.
1941).
34 See U.C.C. § 9-205, Comments 1-3.
35 Gordon, supra note 3, at 63.
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HI. THE CASES
The first case to come to grips with the floating lien problem was
Rosenberg v. Rudnick,36 decided by the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts. By a security agreement executed
on April 30, 1962 in connection with a loan, the debtor (Boyle Sundries,
Inc.) gave Rudnick a security interest in all its equipment, machinery,
fixtures, inventory and accounts receivable, " 'together with all addi-
tions thereto and all property now or hereafter substituted therefor or
otherwise acquired in the ordinary course of business.'" 38 Financing
statements covering this collateral were filed. On November 9, 1962, an
involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the debtor, and
adjudication followed on December 12, 1962. The debtor's trustee
claimed the items of inventory acquired by the debtor during the four
months preceding bankruptcy, and brought a proceeding to set aside the
security interest of Rudnick in these items as a voidable preference.
Relying on Sections 9-303 and 9-204(1) and (2) (d) of the Code,
the trustee argued that Rudnick's lien under the security agreement
attached separately to each item of inventory as it was acquired by
the debtor.38 The secured party relied on the "entity" theory, the "lien
creditor" theory and the provisions of Section 9-108 of the Code.
Judge Ford first dealt with the "lien creditor" argument, respond-
ing to the trustee's contentions that perfection under state law was
necessary to meet the test of section 60(a) (2), and that Rudnick's
interest in the debtor's future inventory could not be perfected until
the debtor obtained rights in the inventory. He stated:
The specific test of § 60(a) (2) is one of when under state
law the security interest, however described, becomes one
which cannot be defeated by a subsequent lien obtainable in
proceedings on a simple contract action. Perfection under
state law need not be full perfection but only perfection so Jar
as is necessary to meet the test of § 60(a) (2). While the
Massachusetts law may not regard a security interest in after-
acquired inventory as fully perfected until it attaches to items
as they are acquired by the debtor, nevertheless § 9-204 (3)
recognizes that a lien in such inventory items can be validly
created by a security agreement. Such a lien, after proper
compliance with the filing provisions, is superior to a sub-
sequently acquired contract creditor's lien or other claims
of third parties except the rights of buyers in the ordinary
38 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967).
37 Id. at 636.
38 Id. at 638.
275
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
course of business under § 9-307(1) and holders of perfected
purchase money security interests under § 9-312(3)."
Judge Ford did not rely solely on the "lien creditor" theory. He
noted that Section 9-108 of the Code presents "a different approach to
the problem" by determining that even though the security interest
attaches separately to each item of collateral, the collateral is deemed
to be taken for "new value" rather than for an "antecedent debt."
He pointed out that no definition of "antecedent debt" has been for-
mulated under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, and determined that,
while the question is one of federal rather than state law, "the defini-
tion of § 9-108 should be regarded as generally accepted and in accord
with current business practice and understanding and hence applied in
bankruptcy.""
The "entity" theory was also accepted by the court. Judge Ford
cited the statement by Chief Judge Magruder in Manchester Nat'l
Bank v. Roche and concluded that "[t]he security interest is in the
entity as a whole, not in its individual components, and the transfer
of property occurs when this interest in the inventory as an entity is
created.""
In summary, the court emphasized that the transaction involved
was not a "secret" lien of the type that the provisions of section 60
were designed to avoid. "No supplier who sold merchandise on credit to
[the debtor] can justifiably claim he relied on the appearance of
[debtor's] inventory.' Compliance with the Code's filing require-
ments eliminated any possibility of "secret" liens.
The Rosenberg opinion gave strong support to the contentions of
the secured creditor when In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co."
was decided by the District Court for the District of Oregon. This was
a petition to review a referee's decision disallowing, as preferences,
certain claims of a secured party. The decision of the referee, which
has been widely discussed, rejected the "entity" theory and ruled that
Section 9-108 of the Code conflicted with the Bankruptcy Act and
could not be applied." The facts, in brief were as follows. The creditor,
Rose City Development Company, made loans to the debtor, a com-
pany formed by striking unions to publish a daily newspaper in Port-
land, Oregon. To secure these loans the debtor gave Rose City a
39 Id.
49 Id. at 639.
41 Id. "In applying 60, however, inventory subjected to a security interest should
be viewed as a single entity and not as a mere conglomeration of individual items each
subject to a separate lien." Id.
42 Id.
43 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967).
44 In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co. [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Bankr.
L. Rep. 61,722 (D. Ore. 1966).
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security interest in all of its accounts receivable "now existing or
hereafter arising." A financing statement describing the collateral was
filed. Ten months later, following a petition in bankruptcy, the debtor
was declared bankrupt. The referee accepted the trustee's contention
that the security interest of Rose City was a voidable preference to
the extent that it covered accounts receivable which came into existence
within the four months prior to bankruptcy." The opinion of Chief
Judge Solomon, following the analysis of Rosenberg v. Rudnick,
reached the opposite result. The court relied on the "entity" theory
and the "substitution of collateral" theory, noting that "the bankrupt's
estate will not be diminished because the creditor is only receiving a
substitution of security. There is no preference when new accounts are
substituted for released old ones."" Chief Judge Solomon also agreed
with Judge Ford's conclusion that the phrase "antecedent debt" in
section 60, while a matter of federal law, should be interpreted in a
manner consistent with Section 9-108 of the Code, which reflects
a national consensus about good business practice. 47 Again agreeing
with Judge Ford, the court concluded that the transaction under review
bears no similarity to the "secret" liens at which section 60 is aimed."
The same result was reached by the District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio in the case of In re White," involving a security inter-
est in inventory. In a cryptic opinion citing Rosenberg and Portland the
court reversed a referee's decision denying the secured party's petition
for reclamation.
The final case in this series is In re Grain Merchants of Ind.,
Inc.," decided by the District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana. Here, the court reached the same conclusion, but by a some-
what different route. In this case the Union Bank made loans to Grain
Merchants, secured in part by a security agreement covering "accounts
receivable then belonging to Grain Merchants or thereafter received
by or belonging to Grain Merchants."' Appropriate financing state-
ments were filed. On October 27, 1966, Grain Merchants filed a volun-
tary petition in bankruptcy. Its trustee claimed that all accounts
receivable of Grain Merchants which came into existence within four
months prior to bankruptcy were transferred to the bank during this
period, and, therefore, were voidable preferences. The referee accepted
this argument and ordered the bank to turn over to the trustee the
proceeds of accounts receivable arising during the four months in
45 Id. at 71,140.
48 271 F. Supp. at 401.
47 Id. at 400.
48 Id. at 401.
45 283 F. Supp. 208 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
50 286 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
51 Id. at 599.
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question. Judge Eschbach set aside the order of the referee, relying on
the "entity" theory as a matter of federal law, and found that a con-
sideration of the effect of Section 9-108 of the Code was unnecessary."
The decision is based primarily on an analysis of the legislative history
of section 60 which led the Judge to conclude that the various amend-
ments to section 60 were intended to eliminate only "secret" liens, and
should not be applied to void a security interest accompanied by public
notice made prior to the preference period.
An unfortunate aspect of the opinion is the statement that the
transfer of all accounts receivable took place at the time when the
bank filed its financing statement, 53
 which was "well in advance of
the bank's extension of credit to Grain Merchants."' Section 9-303(1)
states that if filing takes place "before the security interest attaches,
it is perfected at the time when it attaches." As discussed previously,
a security interest cannot become perfected until it has attached and a
security interest cannot attach, under section 9-204(1), until "value
is given and the debtor has rights in the collateral." Even if the debtor
can be considered to have rights in the mass or "entity" of his present
and future accounts and inventory, a security interest cannot attach
to this mass or entity of collateral until value is given by the secured
party. The court's conclusion, therefore, as to the time of the transfer
is probably mistaken. The date of perfection and transfer would appear
to be the date on which the bank "gave value." To this extent at least,
the method of perfection is a matter of state law and the date of filing
would not meet the standards of perfection required for a transfer
under section 60(a) (2)."
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE CASES
The main theme running through the cases is a determination
that the floating lien is not the type of interest at which the various
amendments of section 60 were aimed. In taking this approach, rather
than a mechanical word-by-word comparison of the various sections
of the Bankruptcy Act and the Code, the decisions avoid the kind of
overly literal statutory construction exemplified by decisions such as
Klauder, which made necessary the 1950 amendments to section 60.
Professor Gilmore has suggested that the present version of section 60
52 Id. at 602-05.
53 Id. at 602.
54 Id. at 601.
55 Under U.C.C. 	 9-303(1) such a security interest would be unperfected, and it
would be subordinate to state lien creditors under U.C.C. §§ 9-3010) (b) and 9-204.
Therefore no "transfer" could occur for bankruptcy purposes until the missing element
fell into place.
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"does not mesh with Article 9 of the Code a great deal better than the
1938 revision meshed with pre-Code security law.""
Once it is established that the Code's floating lien is not the type
of security device at which section 60 is aimed, the "entity," "lien
creditor" and "substitution of collateral" theories are used to cement
over the apparent contradictions between the language of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and the Code on the one hand and the intent of the Congress
on the other. The way in which Section 9-108 of the Code is used is
curious. It is not considered as binding federal court interpretations
of the term "antecedent debt," as used in the Bankruptcy Act; rather
it serves as the source in which the federal courts find the "current
business practice and understanding" on which the federal definition
is to be based. Such a conclusion about the federal definition of "ante-
cedent debt" removes the last obstacle to validation of the floating lien
in bankruptcy.
This analysis seems appropriate, in view of the unfortunate results
of a more literal analysis in cases like Kiander. It is to be hoped that
federal appellate courts will take the same view and spare the bar and
business community the necessity of further revisions of section 60.
60 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 3, at 1303
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